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Abstract— Members of a criminal organization, who hold central 
positions in the organization, are usually targeted by criminal 
investigators for removal or surveillance. This is because they play key 
and influential roles by acting as commanders who issue instructions 
or serve as gatekeepers. Removing these central members (i.e., 
influential members) is most likely to disrupt the organization and put 
it out of business. Most often, criminal investigators are even more 
interested in knowing the portion of these influential members, who 
are the immediate leaders of lower-level criminals. These lower-level 
criminals are the ones who usually carry out the criminal works; 
therefore, they are easier to identify. The ultimate goal of investigators 
is to identify the immediate leaders of these lower-level criminals in 
order to disrupt future crimes. We propose in this paper a forensic 
analysis system called SIIMCO that can identify the influential 
members of a criminal organization. Given a list of lower-level 
criminals in a criminal organization, SIIMCO can also identify the 
immediate leaders of these criminals. SIIMCO first constructs a 
network representing a criminal organization from either Mobile 
Communication Data that belongs to the organization or from crime 
incident reports. It adopts the concept space approach to 
automatically construct a network from crime incident reports. In 
such a network, a vertex represents an individual criminal and a link 
represents the relationship between two criminals. SIIMCO employs 
formulas that quantify the degree of influence/importance of each 
vertex in the network relative to all other vertices. We present these 
formulas through a series of refinements. All the formulas incorporate 
novel-weighting schemes for the edges of networks. We evaluated the 
quality of SIIMCO by comparing it experimentally with two other 
systems. Results showed marked improvement. 
   Index Terms— Forensic investigation, digital forensic, forensic 
analysis, criminal network, social network, mobile communication 
data, relative importance, central nodes. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Social network analysis (SNA) has long been used for identifying 
social groups and for determining the relationships among the 
members of social groups [3, 47]. In SNA, a network that depicts a 
social group needs to be constructed first and then analyzed. In 
such a network, a vertex represents a member of a social group and 
an edge represents the relationship between two members (e.g., it 
relates two vertices). Mobile Communication Data (MCD) is a way 
of constructing a social network, where a vertex in the network 
represents a person (i.e., a contact) and an edge represents a flow 
of communications between two persons (e.g., phone call records, 
messages, etc.). The communication records are collected either 
directly from mobile devices or indirectly from mobile network 
providers. Researchers from multidisciplinary fields took 
advantage of the valuable information contained in MCD to infer 
useful patterns and trends. For example, Urban Planning engineers 
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analyze MCD to understand driving behavior and determine areas 
of congestion [17]. Health Care researchers analyze MCD to 
understand the correlation between human mobility and the 
spreading of infectious diseases in a specific geographical area [1]. 
          Usually, forensic investigators aim at identifying individuals 
who are involved or can potentially be involved in a criminal 
activity [22]. Digital Forensics has emerged as a promising tool for 
forensic investigators. Usually, forensic investigators analyze 
communication records to infer the relationships among criminal 
suspects. In recent years, forensic investigators have shown a 
significantly growing interest on employing MCD for detecting 
criminal communities and identifying the influential members of 
these communities [22]. Usually, criminals involved in organized 
crimes, such as drug trafficking, terrorism, and criminal gangs, plot 
their activities through mobile phone communications [22]. For 
example, drug traffickers most often communicate with each other 
through mobile phones to contemplate and arrange for the 
smuggling, distributing, and selling of drugs [22]. The 
relationships among these criminals can be modeled as a network, 
where each vertex in the network represents a criminal and his 
specific role in the crime and each edge represents the 
communication attempts between two criminals. Therefore, it is 
imperative for forensic investigators to analyze such a network to 
determine how criminals are related and to identify the influential 
members of a criminal organization. Towards this, we analyze the 
structure of the network (i.e., how the communications between the 
criminals flow). In Digital Forensics, MCD has also been used 
extensively for identifying the dynamics of criminal networks. 
       After constructing a network that depicts the members of a 
criminal organization and their relationships, forensic investigators 
usually attempt to identify the relative importance of each vertex 
in the network to identify the most important vertices representing 
the influential members of the organization. In literature, this is 
known as the relative importance problem [21]. A large number of 
methods have been developed in recent years for determining the 
relative importance of vertices. Most of these methods employ 
standard network metrics techniques, k-clique techniques [20, 23, 
30], or semantic similarities techniques [8].   
             Most often, criminal investigators are even more interested 
in knowing a portion of the influential members of a criminal 
organization, who are the immediate leaders of lower-level 
criminals. These lower-level criminals are the ones who usually 
carry out the criminal works; therefore, they are easier to identify 
(e.g., easier to implicate and arrest). The ultimate goal of 
investigators is to identify the immediate leaders of these lower-
level criminals in order to disrupt future crimes. Given a list of 
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vertices representing lower-level criminals in a network depicting 
a criminal organization, forensic criminal investigators would try 
to identify the most important vertices to this list of vertices. These 
vertices would represent the immediate leaders to the given list of 
lower-level criminals. The vertices in a network that represents 
lower-level criminals are known as query vertices.  
          We propose in this paper a forensic analysis system called 
SIIMCO (System for Identifying the Influential Members of a 
Criminal Organization). SIIMCO can identify the most influential 
members of a criminal organization. Given a list of lower-level 
criminals in a criminal organization, SIIMCO can also identify the 
immediate leaders of these lower-level criminals. Identifying the 
influential members of a criminal organization is one of the most 
important tasks that criminal investigators undertake. Usually, 
members of a criminal organization, who hold central positions in 
a criminal organization, are targeted by criminal investigators for 
removal or surveillance [5, 31]. This is because these central 
members (i.e., influential members) usually play key and 
influential roles in the organization by either acting as commanders 
who issue instructions to other members or serving as gatekeepers, 
who receive and distribute information and goods to other 
members. Removing these central members is most likely to 
disrupt the organization and put it out of business. Shang et al. [39] 
stated that a common problem in a criminal investigation that 
involves a criminal organization is to identify the leaders of the 
organization before they make an arrest. Memon [33] stated that 
the identification of key actor(s) in criminal covert networks is a 
major objective for criminal investigators. Memon also stated that 
by isolating or eliminating key actors in a criminal network, the 
network can be destabilized or, at least, its ability to effectively 
function can be significantly reduced. Wiil et al. [46] stated that the 
identification and elimination of key nodes in a terrorist network 
will decrease the ability of the network to function normally. 
Investigators always know several members of a conspiracy, but 
hope to identify the leaders before they make arrests [2, 48]. The 
way to put an end to a criminal organization traditionally was to 
arrest the leaders, thereby incapacitating the remaining bad guys 
that did most of the leg work [27]. 
          Despite the success of most current methods for identifying 
the vertices that are important to query vertices, these methods 
suffer incomplete contribution and inconsistent contribution. 
Incomplete contribution occurs, if some query vertices do not 
contribute to the overall relative importance value of a vertex. The 
inconsistent contribution occurs, if query vertices contribute 
unequally to the overall relative importance value of a vertex. Let 
v be the current vertex under consideration. SIIMCO overcomes 
the problem of Incomplete Contribution by: (1) considering the 
importance of each query vertex to v, and (2) assigning a weight to 
each incoming edge to v that is outgoing from one of the query 
vertices (this weight represents the importance/rank of this vertex 
relative to all incoming edges to v). SIIMCO overcomes the 
problem of Inconsistent Contribution by: (1) considering the 
importance of each query vertex to each vertex connected to v, and 
(2) accounting for the degree of relativity of v to all query vertices. 
That is, SIIMCO overcomes the incomplete and inconsistent 
contribution limitations of most current methods outlined above.  
             In the framework of SIIMCO, a network can be 
constructed from MCD that belongs to a criminal organization. In 
such a network, a vertex represents a criminal (i.e., a 
caller/receiver) and an edge represents a flow of 
communications/information between two criminals (e.g., phone 
call records, messages, etc.). A network can also be constructed 
from crime incident reports. These reports usually include the 
names of criminals/suspects, the type of crime, and the location and 
date of the crime. We assume that criminals who appear in the same 
crime incident report collaborate in committing crimes. We also 
assume that the more criminals appear in the same crime incident 
reports the stronger their relationships are. Thus, the number of co-
occurrences of criminals’ names in the same crime incident reports 
can be considered indicative of the strength/weight of the 
relationships between these criminals [19]. SIIMCO adopts the 
concept space approach [9] to construct a network automatically 
from crime incident reports [10]. In such networks, a vertex 
represents an individual criminal, a link represents the relationship 
between two criminals, and a co-occurrence weight of a link 
represents a relational strength between two criminals. 
         SIIMCO identifies the influential members of a criminal 
organization using a formula that quantifies the degree of 
influence/importance of each criminal in a criminal organization 
relative to all other criminals in the organization. The formula 
identifies the central (i.e., influential) members by determining the 
vertices that represent them in the network depicting the criminal 
organization. In this paper, we present this formula through a series 
of enhancements and improvement refinements. SIIMCO also 
identifies the immediate leaders of a given list of lower-level 
criminals using a formula that quantifies the degree of 
influence/importance of each criminal in the criminal organization 
on the given list of lower-level criminals (i.e., query vertices). 
Given a set of query vertices representing lower-level criminals, 
SIIMCO determines the relative importance of each vertex in the 
network with respect to the query vertices. In this paper, we also 
present the formula that identifies the immediate leaders of lower-
level criminals through a series of enhancements and improvement 
refinements. All the formulas incorporate novel weighting schemes 
for the edges of networks. Let v  be a vertex under consideration. 
The formula takes into consideration several factors such as the 
importance of v , the importance of the vertices connected with v
, the degree of relativity of v  to all query vertices, and the ranking 
of all vertices based on their overall importance in the network. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A number of methods have been proposed to identify the set of 
suspicious source nodes (e.g., fake followers, botnets, etc.) on a 
given criminal network. For example, Meng et al. [32] introduced 
the concepts of “synchronized” and “abnormal” nodes to 
investigate the behavior patterns of source nodes in a criminal 
network in order to identify suspicious nodes. The authors spot 
suspicious nodes by plotting synchronicity-normality points. 
Source nodes are considered synchronized if they have very similar 
behavior patterns. Source nodes are considered abnormal if their 
behavior pattern is very different from the majority of other nodes. 
The authors define the synchronicity of a node u as the average 
closeness between each pair of u’s targets, as shown in Equation 1. 
The authors define the normality of a node u as the average 
closeness between each pair of u’s targets and other nodes, as 
shown in Equation 2. 
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 ),( vvc  : The closeness (similarity) between two 
target nodes v  and v . 
 )(u : The set of u ’s target nodes. 
 )(udo : The out-degree of node u , which is the 
number of its targets, i.e. the size of )(u  
 u : The set of nodes. 
 N : The number of nodes in set u . 
            Recently, structural analysis techniques have been used for 
investigating and identifying criminal communities [31]. For 
example, CrimeNet Explorer [22] divides a network depicting a 
criminal organization into subgroups based on their strength of 
relations, using hierarchical clustering technique. To identify the 
influential members of a subgroup, it employs the well-known 
Degree Centrality, Closeness Centrality, and Betweenness 
Centrality metrics. To determine the degree of relationship 
between two vertices, it uses the shortest path algorithm and 
Blockmodeling [4]. In 2013, Catanese et al. [11] introduced an 
initial version of a system called LogAnalysis. The system was 
intended for forensic visual statistical analysis of mobile phone 
logs. In this initial version of LogAnalysis, the relationships among 
mobile phone users are represented graphically, which helps in 
understanding the hierarchies within criminal organizations and 
discovering key and central members inside those organizations 
[11]. This also helps to visually discover gangs, by measuring their 
cohesion in terms of the density of internal connections [11]. This 
is done by exploiting the centrality measures provided by the Social 
Network Analysis. The system can also help in analyzing temporal 
information from phone call networks [11]. In 2014, LogAnalysis 
was improved and enhanced to identify the influential criminals in 
a criminal organization by determining the degree of relationships 
between the vertices representing criminals [14]. The enhanced 
version of LogAnalysis uses the Girvan and Newman [18] and 
Newman [34] algorithms. It uses the Girvan & Newman algorithm 
to compute edge betweenness. It uses the Newman algorithm to 
cluster the network hierarchically using a greedy strategy by 
aggregating vertices to form tighter sub-communities. A sub-
community is determined by considering the entire topology of the 
network. The system applies statistical metrics to analyze the 
relationships among vertices to identify the sub-communities that 
represent tied relationships among their members. 
           Kleinberg [26] proposed a technique for locating high-
quality information using a structural analysis of the link topology 
surrounding authoritative nodes in a graph.  The techniques can be 
applied for identifying authoritative nodes in any graph, even 
though the authors believe that the technique is more compelling 
in the context of the Web for discovering the most authoritative 
webpages in a specific search topic. The authors observe that a 
certain natural type of equilibrium exists between hub nodes and 
authority nodes in a graph defined by the link structure, and they 
construct an algorithm for identifying important nodes using this 
observation. A hub is a node that links many related authority 
nodes. An authority node is a node that is pointed to by many hubs. 
       Other network analysis techniques have been used for 
detecting communities. One of these techniques is called k-clique. 
The term "clique" was introduced by Luce and Perry [23]. A clique 
is a graph/network, whose vertices are connected. Each k-clique 
subnetwork represents a community [29]. The input to a system 
employing the k-clique technique is a network along with a value 
k, and the output is a clique of size k. The authors in [20] used the 
k-clique technique for identifying the communities involved in the 
so-called Nigerian fraud scamming. The authors linked the email 
addresses of the scammers to Facebook profiles. The result was a 
social network consisting of over 40,000 vertices. Then, the authors 
transformed the network into 7-clique and 6-clique communities. 
The authors demonstrated strong ties among vertices in each 
clique. Similarly, the authors of [30] employed the k-clique 
technique to investigate the relationships among a community of 
hackers called Shadowcrew.  
           Social network analysis (SNA) has long been used for 
identifying social groups and for determining the relationships 
among the members of social groups [3, 47]. In recent years, digital 
forensic investigators have shown a significantly growing interest 
in employing similar network analysis techniques for detecting 
criminal communities and identifying the influential members of 
these communities [22]. Relational analysis is mainly used for 
determining the central/important vertices in a social network (i.e., 
the influential members of a social group). This is done by 
assigning weights to edges to reflect the relational strength of the 
vertices connected by the edges. The metrics used in Relational 
Analysis can be classified as Degree Centrality, Closeness 
Centrality, or Betweenness Centrality. Degree is the number of ties 
that a vertex has. Vertices with a high degree of centrality are 
central in the network. The degree centrality is calculated as shown 
in Equation 3, where n is the number of vertices in the network and 
xuv equals 1 if vertices v and u are connected and 0 otherwise.   
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The betweenness centrality of a vertex is computed based on the 
number of shortest paths between other vertices that pass through 
this vertex. The betweenness centrality is calculated as shown in 
Equation 4, where σst is the number of shortest paths between 
vertex s and vertex t, and σst(u) is the number of shortest paths 
between vertex s and vertex t that pass through u. 
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Closeness is the length of the shortest path to all other vertices. It 
measures how a vertex is close to other vertices. The closeness 
centrality is calculated as shown in Equation 5, where d(ui, uj) is 
the distance between vertex ui and vertex uj.   
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Other Relational Analysis techniques have been used in different 
fields. For example, they have been used for determining the 
semantic similarities of the members of a social group [43, 44, 45]. 
Social Network Positional Analysis considers the overall structure 
of a social network. The key method for Positional Analysis is 
blockmodeling [4]. Blockmodeling involves the following two 
steps: (1) network partitioning, and (2) interaction pattern 
identification. In network partitioning, a network is divided into 
positions based on the structural similarities among the vertices of 
the network [28]. Similar techniques have also been used in the 
area of bioinformatics [40, 42].    
III. NETWORK CREATION 
The structure of a network can be a valuable intelligence tool that 
can help digital forensic investigators to infer important 
information to identify criminals and their leaders and to disrupt 
future criminal acts. Usually, network topologies can be classified 
based on their structures into hierarchical structure, cellular 
structure, flat structure, chain structure, and star structure.  
          In hierarchical structure (e.g., [37]), vertices are clustered 
based on their degree of relationships. In cellular structure [41], the 
network consists of strongly related subgroups connected by 
bridges. Vertices and edges have the same cellular component 
types. All vertices are strongly connected with one another so that 
information between any two vertices can flow directly. In flat 
structure [25], each vertex is connected with other vertices either 
directly or through a few vertices. In chain structures [15], vertices 
are connected one by one so that information can flow from one 
vertex to another. In star structures [5], vertices are all connected 
to a central vertex, which acts as a hub. That is, the network has a 
centralized structure. The removal of the central vertex can disrupt 
the network. In the framework of SIIMCO, a hybrid hierarchical-
flat structure is adopted as a network topology. In subsections A 
and B, we describe two approaches employed by SIIMCO for 
gathering the information needed to construct networks.  
A. Creating a Network from Mobile Communication Data 
belongs to Criminals 
In the framework of SIIMCO, a network can be constructed from 
MCD that belongs to a criminal organization. In such a network, a 
vertex represents a criminal (i.e., a caller/receiver) and an edge 
represents a flow of communications/information between two 
criminals (e.g., phone call records, messages, etc.). That is, an edge 
relates two vertices in the network to each other. The weight of an 
edge connecting two vertices represents the number of 
calls/messages between the two criminals represented by the two 
vertices. Thus, a weight of an edge reflects the relational strength 
of the vertices connected by the edge. The communication records 
are collected either directly from mobile devices that belong to the 
criminals or indirectly from mobile network providers. We denote 
a network constructed from MCD as N = (V, E), where V is a 
(finite) set of vertices representing criminals, and E is a (finite) set 
of edges connecting vertices. 
B. Creating a Network from Crime Incident Reports 
In the framework of SIIMCO, a network can also be constructed 
from crime incident reports. These reports usually include the 
names of criminals/suspects, the type of crime, and the location and 
date of the crime. We assume that criminals who appear in the same 
crime incident report collaborate in committing crimes. We also 
assume that the more criminals appear in the same crime incident 
reports the stronger their relationships are. Thus, the number of co-
occurrences of criminals’ names in the same crime incident reports 
can be considered as indicative of the strength/weight of the 
relationships between these criminals [19]. This is because the co-
occurrence of criminals’ names in the same reports can reveal 
certain patterns, which can be transformed to relationships (i.e., 
edges) in the network. In such networks, a vertex represents an 
individual criminal, a link represents the relationship between two 
criminals, and a co-occurrence weight of a link represents a 
relational strength between two criminals. The weights of links are 
normalized to a value in the range between 0 and 1. 
          Constructing networks by manually extracting relational 
data from crime incident reports can be very time-consuming. 
Therefore, SIIMCO adopts the concept space approach [10] to 
construct networks automatically from crime incident reports [13]. 
SIIMCO employs this concept to identify the relationships among 
criminals and transforms these relationships into networks. This 
concept identifies related words/phrases based on their co-
occurrences in the same documents (e.g., crime incidents). The 
names of each two criminals/suspects in a crime incident report 
represents a pair. A pair of words/phrases is determined to be 
related based on the frequency of their co-occurrences in the 
sentences of the same crime incidents. The relationship of each pair 
is assigned a weight that reflects the strength of the relationship. 
This weight is determined based on the statistical significance of 
the co-occurrences of the pair in crime incident reports. That is, the 
more the pair co-occur the more related it is.  
          The concept space approach has the advantage of preventing 
extremely large co-occurrence weights from being skewed [9]. 
SIIMCO can accept as an input any criminal-related document 
such as a crime incident report, financial transaction records, and 
telephone records. SIIMCO uses Stanford Named Entity 
Recognition (NER) [38] techniques for identifying the names of 
criminals/suspects in reports. SIIMCO uses a tokenizer and 
stemmer to align a sequence of words and the names of persons. A 
person’s stemmed words are aligned against input reports. 
C. Constructing an Algorithm for Creating a Network 
We constructed an algorithm called CONST-NW (see Fig. 1) that 
constructs a network from an input MCD or a crime incident report. 
The algorithm constructs a network in terms of adjacency lists. 
That is, it represents a network in terms of the adjacency lists of its 
vertices. An adjacency list is a linked list that identifies all the 
vertices to which a particular vertex is connected. Algorithm 
CONST-NW stores an input network’s set of vertices V in a queue 
called Q. The adjacencies of each vertex u V are stored in an 
array called Adj[u] (see lines 3 and 8). The parents of each vertex 
v V are stored in an array called π[v]. The frequency of co-
occurrences of the pair u and v in criminal incident reports are 
normalized by dividing it  by the sum of the overall frequencies n 
and stored in a variable called w(u, v) as the weight of the edge (u, 
v) (see line 10). The adjacency lists that represents the network are 
stored in a queue called NW (see line 11).  
          The network information are then stored in database tables. 
Each table stores the information of a vertex u V. Each tuple 
holds each vertex v Adj[u], the weight w(u, v), and the parents of 
u. The stored data will be used later for structural analysis and for 
network visualization. 
 
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 
CONST-NW 
1.  for each vertex u   V  
2.               π[u] ← NIL 
3.               Adj[u] ← NIL 
4.  Q ← Ø 
5.  ENQUEUE(Q) 
6.  while Q ≠ Ø 
7.          do u ← DEQUEUE(Q) 
8.                    Adj[u] ← v 
9.                   π[v] ← u 
10.                 w(u, v) ← Occurrences(u, v)/n 
11.                 ENQUEUE(NW, Adj[u]) 
Fig. 1: Algorithm CONST-NW 
IV. IDENTIFYING THE INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF CRIMINAL 
NETWORKS AND CRIMINAL SUB-NETWORKS 
Members of a criminal organization, who hold central positions in 
the organization, are targeted by criminal investigators for removal 
or surveillance [5, 31]. This is because these central members 
usually play key and important roles in the organization by acting 
as commanders who issue instructions to other members or serving 
as gatekeepers, who receive and distribute information and goods 
to other members. Removing these central members is most likely 
way to disrupt the organization and put it out of business. In 
subsection A, we construct a formula that identifies these 
influential/important members by determining the vertices 
representing them in a network depicting the criminal organization. 
          Often, investigators are even more interested in knowing 
a portion of the influential members of a criminal organization, 
who are the immediate leaders of lower-level criminals. These 
lower-level criminals are the ones who usually carry out the 
criminal works and are therefore easier to identify (e.g., easier to 
implicate and arrest). The ultimate goal of investigators is to 
identify the leaders of these lower-level criminals in order to 
disrupt future crimes. In subsection B, we construct a formula that 
identifies the immediate leaders to a given list of lower-level 
criminals under investigation. The formula identifies the most 
important vertices to a given list of vertices representing lower-
level criminals in a network depicting a criminal organization. 
A. Identifying the Influential Members of a Criminal 
Organization 
We construct a formula that quantifies the degree of 
influence/importance of each criminal in a criminal organization 
relative to all other criminals in the organization. We construct the 
formula through two refinements. We introduce the initial formula 
in subsection 1. We refine and optimize it in subsection 2. 
1) Assigning Weight to a Vertex based on its Number of 
Communication Attempts  
In this subsection, we construct an initial formula that assigns a 
weight to each vertex kv to reflect its importance in the network 
relative to all other vertices. The weight of kv  is determined based 
on the following: 
a) The number of incoming and outgoing phone 
calls/messages to kv  (or, the number of occurrences of 
other vertices in crime incident reports associated with kv
, and the number of occurrences of vertex kv in crime 
incident reports associated with other vertices). 
b) The number of incoming and outgoing edges to kv (i.e., 
the number of vertices that have outgoing edges to kv , and 
the number of vertices that have incoming edges from 
vertex kv ).  
We compute the weights as shown in Equation 6. 
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 )( kvw : Weight of the current vertex under consideration 
(i.e., vertex kv ). 
 ),( ki vv : Number of incoming phone calls/messages to 
vertex kv  from a vertex iv . Or, the number of occurrences 
of a vertex iv  in crime incident reports associated with kv  
 ),( jk vv : Number of outgoing phone calls/messages 
from vertex kv to a vertex jv . Or, the number of 
occurrences of vertex kv in crime incident reports 
associated with a vertex jv . 
 )(invEk : Number of incoming edges to vertex kv (i.e., 
number of vertices that have outgoing edges to vertex 
kv ). 
 )(outvEk : Number of outgoing edges from vertex kv  
(i.e., number of vertices have incoming edges from kv ). 
2) Improving Equation 6 by Assigning Weights to Edges that 
Represent their Significance to the Vertex under Consideration  
In this subsection, we refine and optimize Equation 6 by 
considering the weights of edges as a measure of importance to 
vertices. Towards this, we represent each incoming edge and 
outgoing edge to/from a current vertex under consideration kv  by 
a weight that reflects its importance to kv . We assign a weight to 
each incoming edge to kv to represent its importance/rank to kv  
relative to all incoming edges to kv . Similarly, we assign a weight 
to each outgoing edge from kv to represent its importance/rank to 
kv  relative to all outgoing edges from kv . We revised Equation 6 
accordingly as shown in Equation 7: 
               
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 
        )7(
),(6.0),(8.0
),(),(
)(
)(
1
)(
1
)(
1
)(
1







outv
j
inv
i
outv
j
inv
i
E
k
E
k
E
k
E
k
jkki
jkki
k
vvwvvw
vvwvvw
vw  
 
where ),( ki vvw  and ),( jk vvw  are computed as shown in 
Equations 8 and 9 respectively. 
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 ),( ki vvw : Weight of an incoming edge to the current vertex 
under consideration kv  from a vertex iv . 
 ),( jk vvw : Weight of an outgoing edge from the current 
vertex under consideration kv  to a vertex jv . 
 )(max invk : Maximum number of incoming phone 
calls/messages to vertex kv  from one of the vertices. Or, the 
maximum number of occurrences of one of the vertices in a 
crime incident report associated with kv . 
 )(max outvk : Maximum number of outgoing phone 
calls/messages from kv to another vertex. Or, the maximum 
number of occurrences of kv in a crime incident report 
associated with one of the other vertices. 
Vertices are ranked based on their weights computed using 
Equation 7. Criminals represented by the top-k vertices are 
considered the influential members of the criminal organization. 
B. Identifying the Immediate Leaders of Lower Level Criminals 
Under Investigation 
Criminal investigators sometimes want to know the immediate 
leaders of lower-level criminals, who carry out crimes and are 
under investigation (e.g., under arrest). In this section, we refer to 
the vertices in the network that represent these lower-level 
criminals as query vertices. We construct a formula that quantifies 
the degree of influence of each criminal in a criminal organization 
on a given list of lower-level criminals under investigation (i.e., 
query vertices). We construct the formula through two refinements. 
We introduce the initial formula in subsection 1. We refine it in 
subsection 2. In subsection 3, we describe how the top immediate 
leaders of the given list of lower-level criminals are determined. 
1) Adjusting Equation 7 by Considering the Weights of 
Vertices connected with Query Vertices   
To identify the most important vertices to query vertices, we 
adjusted Equation 7 by considering the following:  (1) the 
importance of each query vertex to the current vertex under 
consideration kv , and (2) the importance of each query vertex to 
each vertex connected with kv . Accordingly, we revised Equation 
7 as shown in Equation 10. 
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where )( ivw  and )( jvw  are computed as shown in Equations 
11 and 12. 
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 )( ivw : Weight of vertex iv , which has an incoming edge 
to vertex kv . 
 )( jvw : Weight of vertex jv , which has an outgoing edge 
from vertex kv . 
 Q : Number of query vertices. 
 )( zqw : Weight of query vertex Qqz , calculated using 
Equation 7. 
 zin
qp : A discretionary parameter denotes the importance of 
incoming edges to vertex iv  originated from zq . The value 
of z
in
qp  is determined heuristically. In our experiments, we 
set the value of z
in
qp  to 0.5. 
 zout
qp : A discretionary parameter denotes the importance of 
outgoing edges from iv to zq . The value of 
z
out
qp  is 
determined heuristically. In our experiments, we set the 
value of z
out
qp  to 0.3. 
 )(invCi : Number of incoming phone calls/messages to 
vertex iv . Or, the number of occurrences of other criminals 
in crime incident reports associated with iv . 
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 )(outvCi : Number of outgoing phone calls/messages from 
vertex iv . Or, the number of occurrences of iv in crime 
incident reports associated with other criminals. 
 )( ivS zq : The score of vertex iv  with regards to query vertex 
zq . It is computed as follows. Let: (1) “a” be the number of 
incoming and outgoing phone calls/messages to and from 
query vertex zq that involve vertex iv  (or, the number of 
occurrences of 
zq in crime incident reports associated with 
iv ), (2) “b” be the number of incoming and outgoing phone 
calls/messages to and from vertex iv  that involve zq  (or, 
the number of occurrences of iv in reports associated with 
zq ), and (3) “c” be the number of incoming and outgoing 
phone calls/messages to and from zq . The score )( ivS zq is 
the probability that the number of incoming and outgoing 
phone calls/messages to and from 
zq that involve vertex iv
(or, the number of occurrences of 
zq in crime incident 
reports associated with iv ) is exactly “k” out of the “c”, and 
it is given by the following Fisher’s exact test [7]:                                                  
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2) Improving Equation 10 by Accounting for the Degree of 
Relativity of the Vertex under Consideration to Query Vertices 
We improve Equation 10 by accounting for the degree of relativity 
of the current vertex under consideration to all the query vertices. 
Towards this, we first compute the summation of the distances d 
from the current vertex under consideration to all query vertices. 
Then, we penalize and scale down the weight of the current vertex 
under consideration relative to its distance from the query vertices, 
by a factor of
1ddecay , where decay is a parameter that can be set 
to a value in the range 0 to 1. Therefore, we adjusted Equation 10 
as shown in Equation 14: 
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 Decay: A parameter that can be set to a value in the range 
0 to 1.  
 d : The summation of the distances from the current vertex 
under consideration to all query vertices. It is an exponent 
that accounts for the degree of relativity of the current 
vertex under consideration to the query vertices. 
 
 
  
3) Identifying the Top Immediate Leaders 
Vertices are ranked based on their weights computed in Equation 
14. A criminal represented by vertex kv is considered an 
immediate leader to the lower-level criminals represented by the 
query vertices, if he or she acquires a weight )( kvw greater than a 
threshold  , which is the value lower than the mean weight by the 
standard error of the normalized mean.   is computed as follows: 
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 V : Set of all vertices. 
C. System Architecture 
Fig. 2 shows the system architecture. The module Network Creator 
receives either MCD or crime incident reports and outputs a 
corresponding network. The module Network Creator includes 
Stanford NER for identifying the names of criminals/suspects in 
crime incident reports. The module uses algorithm CONST-NW 
shown in Fig. 1 to construct a network in terms of the adjacency 
lists of its vertices. The module Influential Member Locator 
receives a network and determines the most influential node in the 
network using Equation 7, which quantifies the degree of 
influence/importance of each node relative to all other nodes in the 
network. The module Immediate Leader Locator receives a 
network and determines the immediate leader of lower-level 
criminals using Equation 14, which quantifies the degree of 
influence of each node to a given list of query nodes. 
 
 
Fig. 2: System architecture 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
We implemented SIIMCO in Java, ran it under Windows 8 and an 
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4200U processor, using a CPU of 2.30 GHz 
and RAM of 4 GB. In this section, we evaluate the quality of 
SIIMCO by comparing it experimentally with CrimeNet Explorer 
[22] and LogAnalysis [14]. We evaluate the three systems using 
two real-world communication records. We also used DBLP 
dataset [12]. We aim at evaluating and comparing the accuracy of 
the three systems for identifying the following:  
1. The influential/important members of a criminal 
organization. Towards this, we evaluate the accuracy of the 
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three systems for identifying the most important vertices in 
the two real-word networks. 
2. The immediate leaders of a given list of lower-level 
criminals in a criminal organization. Towards this, we 
evaluate the accuracy of the three systems for identifying 
the most important vertices to a given list of vertices (i.e., 
query vertices) in the real-word networks. 
The following are brief overviews of CrimeNet Explorer [22] and 
LogAnalysis [14]: 
 CrimeNet Explorer [22]: Given a network, whose vertices 
represent criminals, CrimeNet Explorer divides the network into 
subgroups based on their strength of relations, using hierarchical 
clustering technique. To identify the influential (i.e., important) 
members of a subgroup, CrimeNet Explorer employs the well-
known Degree, Closeness, and Betweenness Centrality metrics. 
To determine the degree of relationship between two vertices, it 
uses the shortest path algorithm and Blockmodeling [4]. 
 LogAnalysis [14]: Given a network, whose vertices represent 
criminals and edges represent mobile phone communications 
between the criminals, LogAnalysis identifies the influential (i.e., 
important) criminals by determining the degree of relationships 
between the vertices. Towards this, it uses the Girvan and 
Newman [18] and Newman [34] algorithms. It uses the Girvan 
and Newman algorithm to compute edge betweenness. It uses the 
Newman algorithm to cluster the network hierarchically using a 
greedy strategy by aggregating vertices to form tighter sub-
communities. A partition (i.e., a sub-community) is determined 
by considering the entire topology of the network. 
A. Compiling Datasets for the Evaluation 
For the evaluation we use two real-world communication datasets: 
Enron email corpus [13, 16, 24] and Nodobo mobile phone records 
dataset [6, 34]. We also used DBLP [12]. We converted the two 
datasets into networks that depict the flow of information between 
users. Below are brief descriptions of the two datasets: 
 Enron email dataset [13, 16, 24]: Enron email corpus are real-
world internal email messages exchanged among Enron’s 
employees and associates [13, 24]. Enron was the 7th largest 
business organization in USA. The email corpus surfaced after a 
criminal scandal involving top Enron employees was publicized. 
The crime started in 1999, when top employees and associates 
started to separate losses from equity and to derivate trades into 
“special purpose entities”.  Most of these emails revolve around 
this. The corpus contains an actual 619,446 email messages that 
belong to 158 Enron employees and associates, including senior 
Enron employees and associates. The dates of the emails are 
between 1998 to 2002. We cleaned the corpus by removing 
emails that were sent to or received from people other than the 
158 employees. We also removed emails that are duplicate, junk, 
blank, or undelivered. The resulting dataset contains 200,136 
emails from 151 Enron employees. We converted the email 
dataset into a network, where a vertex in the network represents 
one of the 151 employees. An edge represents email 
correspondences between two employees. The weight of an edge 
represents the number of emails exchanged between the two 
employees. The raw corpus is currently available online at [16]. 
 Nodobo mobile phone records dataset [6, 34]: Nodobo contains 
mobile phone records of 27 high-school students from September 
2010 to February 2011. The dataset was compiled originally for 
studying mobile phone usage. The dataset includes 13,035 call 
records, 83,542 message records and 5,292,103 presence records. 
We constructed a network from the call and message records. In 
the network, a vertex represents one of the 27 students, an edge 
represents phone calls/messages between two students, and the 
weight of an edge represents the number of phone calls/messages 
between two students. The dataset is available online at [35]. 
 DBLP [12]: DBLP dataset is a network of co-authorship 
relationship between authors in the computer science field. In the 
experiment we used a partial snapshot of the original DBLP 
Bibliography where only the authors from 20 different 
conferences are considered [36]. We constructed a graph from 
the dataset where nodes represent authors and edges represent the 
number of papers in common between two authors. Since the 
relationship is symmetric, the graph is undirected. 
B. Evaluating the Accuracy of the Three Systems to Identify the 
Top Influential Vertices of a Whole Network  
1) Comparing the Systems’ Results with Ground Truth Data 
obtained from Enron’s Publicly Known Information   
The investigation of Enron wrongdoing incriminated 28 Enron 
employees and associates. The names and identities of these 28 
employees have been released to the public [13, 24]. The intensities 
of the emails sent and received by these 28 employees, intuitively, 
are proportionally the highest among the 151 employees in the 
Enron email dataset described in subsection V-A. This is because 
these 28 employees were in the center of the scandal and their 
emails revolved around contemplating and planning the crime. 
Thus, the vertices representing these 28 employees  are the most 
central/important (i.e., influential) ones in the network depicting 
the Enron email dataset, due to the intensity of the emails sent and 
received by these employees. In this test, we consider the vertices 
representing these 28 employees to be ground truth data. We 
evaluate the accuracy of the three systems by comparing the 
influential/important vertices in the network returned by the three 
systems with the vertices representing the 28 employees. Based on 
this, we calculated the accuracy of each system in terms of Recall, 
Precision, and F-value, which are calculated as follows:  
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 
c
sN : The number of correct vertices returned by a system 
(i.e., the number of vertices in the list returned by a system 
that are among the vertices representing the 28 employees). 
 
top
mN : Equals 28 (the number of incriminated employees).  
 
top
sN : The number of vertices in the list of 
influential/important vertices returned by a system.      
Figs. 3 show the Recall, Precision, and F-value of each system in 
each 6-month period from January 1999 to June 2002. Fig. 4 shows 
the overall average Recall, Precision, and F-value. 
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Figs. 3: (a) Recall, (b) Precision, and (c) F-value of the 3 systems on Enron dataset 
in each 6-month period from January 1999 to June 2002 using ground truth data 
obtained from Enron’s publicly known information   
 
 
Fig. 4: The overall average Recall, Precision, and F-value of the 3 systems on Enron 
dataset using ground truth data obtained from Enron’s publicly known information   
2) Calculating the Recall, Precision, and F-value of the Systems 
by comparing their Results with Results Determined by Standard 
Network Metrics  
In this test, we measure the performance of the systems by 
comparing their results with the results determined by the standard 
Closeness, Betweenness, In Degree, and Out Degree Centrality 
metrics. Recall section II for how the Closeness, Betweenness, and 
Degree Centralities are computed. For the sake of fair evaluation 
and comparison, we consider the same threshold   shown in 
Equation 15 for the results returned by the three systems and the 
four standard network metrics. We calculated the Recall, Precision, 
and F-value as shown in Equations 16-18. Let topl be the list of 
important vertices determined by a standard network metric, whose 
weights are bigger than  . In Equations 16-18, 
c
sN is the number 
of correct vertices returned by a system that are found in the list 
topl , and 
top
mN  is the number of vertices in the list topl .  
           We submitted the network representing Enron, Nodobo, and 
DBLP [12] datasets to the four standard network metrics, and we 
also submitted the same network to each of the three systems. We 
then calculated the Recall, Precision, and F-value of the results 
returned by each system. The results are shown in Tables 1-3. 
TABLE I 
PERFORMANCE OF THE THREE SYSTEMS ON THE ENRON DATASET BASED ON THE 
TOP VERTICES RETURNED BY THE STANDARD NETWORK METRICS 
 Recall Precision F-value 
SIIMCO 
C
lo
se
n
e
ss
 
C
en
tr
al
it
y
 0.62 0.56 0.59 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.36 0.41 0.38 
LogAnalysis 0.53 0.51 0.52 
SIIMCO 
B
et
w
ee
n
n
e
s 
C
en
tr
al
it
y
 0.56 0.52 0.54 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.42 0.44 0.43 
LogAnalysis 0.47 0.43 0.45 
SIIMCO 
In
 D
eg
re
e 
C
en
tr
al
it
y
 0.83 0.75 0.79 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.55 0.49 0.52 
LogAnalysis 0.66 0.64 0.65 
SIIMCO 
O
u
t 
D
eg
re
e 
C
en
tr
al
it
y
 0.79 0.76 0.77 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.53 0.55 0.54 
LogAnalysis 0.64 0.58 0.61 
     
 
TABLE 2 
PERFORMANCE OF THE THREE SYSTEMS ON THE NODOBO DATASET BASED ON THE 
TOP VERTICES RETURNED BY THE STANDARD NETWORK METRICS  
 Recall Precision F-value 
SIIMCO 
C
lo
se
n
e
ss
 
C
en
tr
al
it
y
 0.67 0.61 0.64 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.47 0.43 0.45 
LogAnalysis 0.60 0.45 0.51 
SIIMCO 
B
et
w
ee
n
n
e
s 
C
en
tr
al
it
y
 0.63 0.57 0.60 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.43 0.33 0.37 
LogAnalysis 0.49 0.42 0.45 
SIIMCO 
In
 D
eg
re
e 
C
en
tr
al
it
y
 0.76 0.72 0.74 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.58 0.51 0.54 
LogAnalysis 0.64 0.59 0.61 
SIIMCO 
O
u
t 
D
eg
re
e 
C
en
tr
al
it
y
 0.81 0.83 0.82 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.64 0.63 0.63 
LogAnalysis 0.72 0.66 0.69 
            
 
TABLE 3 
PERFORMANCE OF THE THREE SYSTEMS ON THE DBLP DATASET BASED ON THE 
TOP VERTICES RETURNED BY THE STANDARD NETWORK METRICS  
 Recall Precision F-value 
SIIMCO 
C
lo
se
n
e
ss
 
C
en
tr
al
it
y
 0.53 0.56 0.54 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.55 0.52 0.53 
LogAnalysis 0.45 0.48 0.46 
SIIMCO 
B
et
w
ee
n
n
e
s 
C
en
tr
al
it
y
 0.59 0.47 0.52 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.46 0.38 0.42 
LogAnalysis 0.42 0.40 0.41 
SIIMCO 
In
 D
eg
re
e 
C
en
tr
al
it
y
 0.63 0.57 0.60 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.49 0.43 0.46 
LogAnalysis 0.57 0.52 0.54 
SIIMCO 
O
u
t 
D
eg
re
e 
C
en
tr
al
it
y
 0.76 0.69 0.72 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.61 0.53 0.57 
LogAnalysis 0.65 0.57 0.61 
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3) Calculating the Euclidean Distances between the Results 
returned by the Systems and the Results determined by the 
Standard Network Metrics  
We measured the average Euclidean Distance between the top n 
ranked vertices returned by each system and the corresponding top 
n ranked vertices returned by each of the four standard network 
metrics described previously. We considered n equaling 5, 10, and 
15. We used the Euclidean distance measure shown in Equation 19.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
                           
),( smd   = |)()(| vv s
Nx
m
top
m
 

                     (19) 
 
 
top
mN  : List of the top n  vertices returned by metric m  
 
||
]1,0[
top
mN
m  : Ranked list of the top n  vertices 
returned by metric m . 
 
||
]1,0[
top
mN
s  : Ranked list of the top n  vertices 
returned by system s . 
  )(vm  and )(vs : Position of vertex v 
top
mN  in the 
lists 
m  and s respectively (a ranking of a set of n 
vertices is represented as a permutation of the integers 
1, 2, . . . , n).  
Fig. 5 shows the average Euclidean Distances using the three 
datasets. Intuitively, the smaller the distance the better the system. 
 
Fig. 5: The overall average Euclidean distances between the results returned by the 
three systems and the results determined by the four standard networks using Enron, 
Nodobo, and DBLP datasets. 
C. Evaluating the Accuracy of the Three Systems to Identify the 
Top Influential Vertices of a Given List of Query Vertices  
In this section, we evaluate the quality of the three systems to 
identify the immediate leaders of a given list of lower-level 
criminals in a criminal organization. Towards this, we evaluate the 
accuracy of the three systems to identify the most important 
vertices to a given list of vertices (i.e., query vertices) in the 
networks representing Enron and Nodobo datasets. We randomly 
selected 50 lists of 2-query vertices, 50 lists of 3-query vertices, 
and 50 lists of 4-query vertices from both Enron and Nodobo 
networks. We submitted the 150 sets of query vertices along with 
the networks representing the Enron and Nodobo datasets to the 
standard network metrics and the three systems. We considered 
only the top 5 vertices returned by each metric as the list 
topl (recall 
section V-B-2). We compared the top 5 vertices returned by each 
system with the list 
topl . We then calculated the Recall, Precision, 
and F-value of each system. Figs. 6 show the results for the Enron 
dataset. Figs. 7 show the results for the Nodobo dataset. 
 
                                                                     (a) 
 
                                                                    (b) 
 
                                                                      (c) 
Figs. 6: (a) Recall, (b) Precision, and (c) F-value of the 3 systems for identifying the 
important vertices to a given list of query vertices on Enron dataset. 2v, 3v, and 4v 
denote 2 query vertices, 3 query vertices, and 4 query vertices respectively. 
 
 
                                                                        (a) 
 
                                                                      (b) 
 
                                                                    (c) 
Figs. 7: (a) Recall, (b) Precision, and (c) F-value of the 3 systems for identifying the 
important vertices to a given list of query vertices on Nodobo dataset. 2v, 3v, and 
4v denote 2 query vertices, 3 query vertices, and 4 query vertices respectively. 
D. Discussion of the Results  
As Figs. 3-7 and Tables 1-3 show, SIIMCO outperformed 
CrimeNet Explorer [22] and LogAnalysis [14]. The results 
revealed the robustness of the SIIMCO’s method and its ability to 
identify the most important vertices in a network as well as the 
most important vertices to a given list of query vertices. Based on 
our observations of the results of the experiments, we attribute the 
performance of SIIMCO over CrimeNet Explorer and LogAnalysis 
to the following: 
1. Incomplete contribution and inconsistent contribution: Due 
to the nature of the techniques employed by both CrimeNet 
Explorer [22] and LogAnalysis [14], some vertices may not 
contribute to the overall importance value of a vertex 
(Incomplete Contribution) and some vertices may contribute 
unequally to the overall importance value of a vertex 
(Inconsistent Contribution). These are due to the following: 
a) CrimeNet Explorer employs the well-known Degree, 
Closeness, and Betweenness Centrality metrics. Let vx 
be the target vertex. Let vy and vz be vertices under 
consideration. The three metrics will assign a weight to 
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each of vy and vz based on the topology of each vertex in 
the network with regard to each of vy and vz. Therefore, 
vy and vz may have different weights. Consequently, 
their weight-based contributions to vx may be unequal or 
they may not contribute at all to vx. 
b) LogAnalysis uses the Girvan and Newman algorithm 
[18] to compute edge betweenness. The algorithm 
considers the topology of each vertex in the network 
with regard to each vertex under consideration. 
Moreover, the algorithm uses a greedy strategy for 
partitioning the network into sub-communities by 
considering the topology of the entire network. 
Therefore, the contributions of vertices under 
consideration to a target vertex may be unequal or some 
of them may not contribute at all. 
Let v be the current vertex under consideration. SIIMCO 
overcomes the problem of Incomplete Contribution by: (1) 
considering the importance of each query vertex to v, and (2) 
assigning a weight to each incoming edge to v that is outgoing 
from one of the query vertices (this weight represents the 
importance/rank of this vertex relative to all incoming edges to 
v). SIIMCO overcomes the problem of Inconsistent 
Contribution by: (1) considering the importance of each query 
vertex to each vertex connected to v, and (2) accounting for the 
degree of relativity of v to all query vertices. That is, SIIMCO 
overcomes the incomplete and inconsistent contribution 
limitations of most current methods outlined above. 
2. Susceptibility to noise and outliers in data: CrimeNet 
Explorer and LogAnalysis are susceptible to noise and outliers 
in the data, from which a network is constructed. The 
weighting schemes adopted by SIIMCO shown in Equations 
7, 10, and 13 make SIIMCO much less susceptible to noise and 
outliers in data. 
3. Drawback of aggregating vertices and clusters 
hierarchically: The approach adopted by LogAnalysis that 
aggregates vertices and clusters a network hierarchically has 
the following limitations: (1) it is not suitable for clustering a 
large network, if some of the resulting sub-networks are large 
(we observed that it clusters smaller subnetworks more 
accurately than larger sub-networks), (2) it is biased towards 
globular clusters, (3) it can never undo what was incorrectly 
grouped at an early phase, and (4) it may not handle different 
sized clusters accurately.  
4. Limitation with the shortest path approach: To determine the 
degree of relationship between two vertices, CrimeNet 
Explorer uses the shortest path algorithm. The problem with 
this approach is that the weight of a vertex v is determined 
based only on the weight of the most important incoming edge 
e to v and the weight of the vertex connected to v by e. SIIMCO 
overcomes this problem by: (a) considering the weights of all 
incoming edges to v and the weights of all outgoing edges 
from v, and (2) considering the weights of all incoming and 
outgoing edges as a measure of importance of v. Towards this, 
SIIMCO assigns a weight to each incoming edge to v relative 
to all incoming edges to v; it also assigns a weight to each 
outgoing edge from v relative to all outgoing edges from v .  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We presented in this paper a forensic analysis system called 
SIIMCO. The proposed system can identify the influential 
members of a criminal organization and the immediate leaders of a 
given list of lower-level criminals. The techniques adopted by 
SIIMCO overcome the incomplete and inconsistent contribution 
limitations of most current methods. In the framework of SIIMCO, 
a network representing a criminal organization can be constructed 
from MCD that belongs to a criminal organization or from crime 
incident reports. In such a network, a vertex represents an 
individual criminal and a link represents the relationship between 
two criminals. SIIMCO adopts the concept space approach to 
construct a network automatically from crime incident reports. We 
constructed formulas that quantify the degree of influence of each 
criminal in a criminal organization relative to all other criminals in 
the organization. The formulas incorporate novel weighting 
schemes. We evaluated SIIMCO by comparing it experimentally 
with CrimeNet Explorer [22] and LogAnalysis [14]. For the 
evaluation, we used two real-world communication datasets: Enron 
email corpus [13, 16, 24] and Nodobo mobile phone records dataset 
[6, 35]. We also used DBLP dataset [12]. We evaluated the 
accuracy of the three systems by measuring their Recall, Precision, 
and Euclidean Distance with regards to: (1) ground truth data 
obtained from Enron’s publicly known information, and (2) results 
determined by standard network metrics. Results revealed that 
SIIMCO outperforms the other two systems in terms of identifying 
the top influential vertices in a network and also identifying the top 
influential vertices to a given list of query vertices. 
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